




DISPELLING THE HYPE:   
An Examination of SPAC Common Equity Performance  
The U.S. SPAC market has faced explosive growth in recent years, but the financial 
performance of these investments is weakly understood. Therefore, this paper 
contributes an analysis on the long-term performance of SPAC common equity for 
SPACs that completed acquisitions between 2016 and 2018. Using hand-collected data 
from the Compustat – Capital IQ and SEC EDGAR databases, this paper runs a two-
sample t-test assuming unequal variances and constructs an Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) regression model. In conclusion of the t-test, the results suggest that SPAC 
common shares do not outperform the market over a three-year holding period. In 
addition, the regression model identifies SPAC behaviors that signal long-term positive 
yields in common share price. These findings inform investment strategies, and the 
paper goes on to discuss further positions an investor can create to gain exposure to this 
rising investment class.  
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1. Introduction  
In the last decade, gross proceeds raised by Special Purpose Acquisition Companies 
(SPACs) per year grew from $502.6 million in 2010 to $83,042.2 million in 2020 (SPACInsider, 
2021). A SPAC is a company created by a management team with no operational assets, also 
known as a blank check company, that aims to raise equity through an initial public offering 
(IPO) and eventually purchase a private firm at a future date. As demonstrated by Figure 1, the 
U.S. SPAC sector has experienced a five-year compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 88.53% 
from 2016 to 2020. With this explosive growth, SPACs have continued to pull market share from 
traditional IPOs; as of 2020, approximately 50% of the total IPO market consisted of SPAC 
transactions (Potter, 2021).  
 
Note: Figure 1 represents how many SPACs performed IPOs in the U.S. market from 2016 to 2020 as well as the 
gross proceeds raised from these IPOs per year. 5-Year CAGR of 88.53%. Data sourced from the SPACInsider 
database.  
SPACs originally debuted in the 1990’s as an alternative way to take private companies 
public. Despite the increased cost to go public through a SPAC, private companies are allured by 











































Figure 1: The Development of the U.S. SPAC Sector
Number of SPACs Gross Proceeds
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SPACs provide (Pomerantz et. al, 2021). In addition, investors in public equity markets have 
welcomed these unique investments with overwhelming amounts of capital. In comparison to 
traditional equity issued at an IPO, SPACs enable public investors access to private equity 
investments with increased transparency and downside protection (Boyer and Baignet, 2008). 
Although the innovations of SPACs have led to tremendous market hype, minimal 
research has been done to determine how SPAC investments perform in practice. The most 
recent analysis on SPAC returns was studied by Lakicevic and Vulanovic (2013) who examined 
a sample of SPACs from 2003 to 2009. However, the evolving nature of these investments 
renders past literature outdated. In order to understand the SPAC transactions being completed in 
the current market, research in this field must be continually conducted.  
This demand for updated analysis leads to the research question: how do the returns on 
SPAC common equities, that made acquisitions between 2016 and 2018, compare to NASDAQ 
returns in an equivalent three-year holding period? Using hand-collected data from the 
Compustat – Capital IQ and SEC EDGAR databases, this paper evaluates if SPACs outperform 
the market through a two-sample t-test assuming unequal variances. Then, indicators of long-
term SPAC success are identified with an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression model.  
This paper is organized into eight sections. In the following section, the details of SPACs 
as an asset are further explained. Then, in Section 3, existing literature on SPACs is presented, 
highlighting two literature focuses: management interests and shareholder interests. In Section 4, 
the differing risk profiles between SPACs and the NASDAQ are outlined in order to predict 
model outcomes. Section 5 details the process of hand-collecting the data sample and presents 
summary statistics. Section 6 specifies the two approaches, a t-test and an OLS regression model, 
used to address the research question. Then, in Section 7, the significance of the results is 
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discussed and compared to previous research. In Section 8, I explore how the results of this paper 
inform investment decisions and suggest two alternative positions an investor can take to gain 
exposure to SPACs. Lastly, Section 9 offers a conclusion of the findings within this paper and 
provides recommendations for further research.  
2. SPACs as an Asset  
The SPAC process begins once a management team of experienced executives forms a 
SPAC and pursues an IPO as a blank check company. During the SPAC IPO, units, composed of 
common shares and warrants, are initially priced at $10. Shortly after the issuance of units, the 
SPAC will issue common stock and warrants under respective tickers. The IPO proceeds are then 
held in an interest-bearing trust account invested in U.S. government securities while the 
management team searches for an acquisition target. The timeline for a SPAC acquisition is 
outlined in a SPAC’s S-1 filing; typically, a management team has between 18 to 24 months. If a 
management team is unable to complete an acquisition within the specified timeframe, the SPAC 
is liquidated, and proceeds are returned to investors. However, SPACs that do proceed with an 
acquisition target are often subject to a proxy vote to receive shareholder approval of the 
transaction. With majority approval, the SPAC management team will use the proceeds raised to 
acquire the target and eventually execute a reverse merger, dissolving the blank-check company 
and leaving the acquired firm publicly listed (Dimitrova, 2017).  
The advantages of SPAC’s innovative structure and accelerated timeline has allured 
private firms and allowed SPACs to emerge as a prominent alternative route to accessing public 
equity. When going public through a traditional IPO, financial projections are not included in an 
SEC registration statement due to class action litigation risk. However, in a SPAC transaction, 
forward-looking financial statements are protected under the Private Securities Litigation Reform 
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Act. Therefore, target companies disclose financial projections in the proxy statement and S-4 
registration statement filed with the SEC. The ability to include forward-looking financial 
statements allows investors to visualize the target company’s financial growth, adding 
tremendous value for pre-revenue and pre-profit companies. In addition, the SPAC private-to-
public timeline is completed in 3 to 6 months while a traditional IPO may take approximately 
one year to complete. However, the advantages of a SPAC come at a cost. While the professional 
fees associated with an IPO and a SPAC transaction are relatively similar, ranging from 3-7% of 
gross proceeds raised, a SPAC transaction requires an additional sponsor fee paid. At the close of 
a SPAC merger, the acquired company must compensate the SPAC management team by 
allowing them to purchase 20% of the firm’s common equity for only $25,000 (Pomerantz et. al, 
2021). 
Compared to traditional common equity issued at an IPO, SPACs also provide public 
investors unique alternative investment opportunities. Previously, private equity investments 
were exclusive to institutional investors, but SPACs gave the public access to invest in 
substantial acquisitions. Furthermore, the public status of a SPAC subjects the company to 
specific SEC reporting requirements and to the voting rights of shareholders to approve an 
acquisition, implying more transparency than private equity investments (Boyer and Baignet, 
2008). Although the business combination is not known at the time of the IPO, the structure of 
SPACs presents limited downside to investors. When the business combination is eventually 
introduced to shareholders, each shareholder has the right to redeem their shares for the initial 
investment and accrued interest of approximately 2% from the trust account (Gahng et al., 2021).  
3. Literature Review 
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Existing literature in this field studies SPACs through two lenses: management interests 
and shareholder interests. Within this section, I first introduce management-centered literature 
that provides insight on optimal SPAC structure. Then, I discuss a series of studies focusing on 
shareholder interests through an examination of the SPAC acquisition approval process as well 
as an analysis on the investment return of SPAC securities. Next, I explore the structural changes 
of SPACs that followed the financial crisis. With these adaptations, I assert that previous 
research is outdated and its relevance to SPACs observed in the current market is limited. The 
findings within paper overcome this research limitation and contribute an updated analysis on 
SPAC behavior in public equity markets. 
Given the approval of an acquisition enables a SPAC to generate returns for the 
management team, Cumming et al. (2014) conducted research on how SPACs should be 
structured and managed to increase the probability of acquisition approval. Through a logit 
model, the researchers analyzed twenty-three explanatory variables in order to identify key 
characteristics of a SPAC that influence deal approval in a proxy vote. The results of this 
analysis suggest that younger SPAC management teams and increased funds in a trust are both 
factors that positively affect deal approval. In addition, approval probabilities decrease when the 
number of underwriters increases.  
However, the management-focused research of Cumming et al. (2014) fails to consider 
the losses shareholders will incur in the event that a flawed transaction is approved. Conversely, 
Jenkinson and Sousa (2011) published research on the deal approval process through a 
shareholder-interested lens. In conclusion of their study, the researchers determined that 
investors should specifically look at how the share price of a SPAC reacts to the announcement 
of a potential acquisition when voting on a transaction. Investors should only vote to approve 
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acquisitions that react positively to the announcement as this decision will yield low risk returns. 
Otherwise, by not carefully evaluating how the market reacts to an acquisition, shareholders will 
contribute to value-destroying decisions.  
Boyer and Baignet (2008) further contributed to shareholder-focused research by 
publishing one of the first papers quantifying the returns on SPAC common stock. Within their 
study, they examined the one-year returns on SPACs that went public between 2003 and 2006. 
The results indicate that returns vary greatly based on the year of issuance; in 2006, the average 
SPAC returned 3.50% whereas the NASDAQ returned 8.48%. In 2005, the average SPAC 
returned 13.76% whereas the NASDAQ returned 3.25%, and in 2004, there was one SPAC 
issued that yielded a return of 33.80% compared to the NASDAQ return of 9.62%. The authors 
provided further insight on SPAC patterns by conducting an OLS regression model that 
determined how select factors are correlated to the one-day returns on SPAC common stock. 
This model identified that the gross proceeds at offering, unit price to offer price ratio, and 
months allowed to complete an acquisition had a significant relationship to the initial share price 
of a SPAC.  
Lakicevic and Vulanovic (2013) expanded upon the research of Boyer and Baignet 
(2008) and evaluated the returns on SPAC units, warrants, and common stock from 2003 to 2009 
at varying points in a SPAC’s lifecycle. With an additional three years of SPACs in the sample, 
the authors’ research captures the effect of large investment banks entering the market and 
underwriting deals on SPAC performance. In conclusion of the study, the researchers found that 
SPAC securities did not reveal a pattern when reacting to announcements regarding changes in 
their corporate status. However, they did observe all three types of securities realized positive 
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abnormal returns on the merger announcement day, and warrants demonstrated the strongest 
reaction of these three securities.  
While Lakicevic and Vulanovic (2013) studied a more recent sample than Boyer and 
Baignet (2008), it is important to recognize that both papers are limited by the infancy of the 
U.S. SPAC market at the time of research. Murray (2017) proposes that SPACs are continuing to 
change as regulators have allowed the market to try new designs to reinforce their position while 
continuing to protect investors. Therefore, as the market approaches maturity, research must 
continually adapt to analyze new trends in SPAC structure; this is particularly evident with the 
next generation of SPACs that arose following a shift in investor preferences during the financial 
crisis. During 2008, no SPACs were formed, but by 2009, SPACs re-emerged with two 
significant adaptations. First, SPACs no longer required shareholder approval when acquiring a 
target firm. Instead, SPACs issued a tender offer to buy back shares from any shareholders who 
did not agree with the acquisition. This change eliminated the power of hedge funds to withhold 
their approval until gaining concessions from SPAC managers. Second, SPACs restructured fees 
so that the management team was not awarded 20% of the common equity at the close of a 
merger. Rather, the SPAC management team would be awarded portions of the common equity 
at different milestones. In turn, this incentivized management to be interested in longer term 
profits for shareholders (Rodrigues and Stegemoller, 2013). The research within this paper will 
capture these two structural changes and build off the work of Boyer and Baignet (2008) and 
Lakicevic and Vulanovic (2013) in order to contribute an updated analysis on the long-term 
performance of SPAC common equity.  
4. Conceptual Model  
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To develop a conceptual model surrounding the financial performance of SPAC common 
equities, I assume that SPAC transactions are structured to acquire companies with increased 
risk. Recall that unlike IPOs, SPACs provide acquired firms the ability to include forward-
looking financial statements within SEC filings (Pomerantz et. al, 2021). Companies with less 
proven business models benefit greatest from this structure as it enables investors to more clearly 
visualize the target company’s financial growth. Given SPACs are a more costly alternative to 
traditional IPOs, I assume that riskier companies will pay the additional cost to access capital 
through this method. In addition, the risk profile of SPACs greatly differs from the NASDAQ; 
the NASDAQ is a diversified index composite whereas SPAC common stock is equity in a 
single company.  
With the conclusion that SPACs as an asset class have a greater risk profile than the 
NASDAQ, I predict that SPAC common equity will generate higher returns than the NASDAQ. 
Financial theory asserts that riskier assets require a greater premium to fairly compensate 
investors for the amount of risk they take on. Thus, SPACs investors will require a higher yield 
on their investments. In addition, I predict that the returns on SPAC common equities will be 
more volatile than returns on the NASDAQ. According to the modern portfolio theory, an 
investor should not be looking at the expected risk and return of only one stock. Instead, an 
investor can create a portfolio of assets that maximizes returns with an optimal amount of risk. 
Pursuing this investment method allows an investor to benefit from diversification that reduces 
volatility and nearly eliminate unsystematic risk. 
When considering the OLS regression model, I predict two variables, one-day return 
post-merger announcement and initial warrant price, will be significantly associated with the 
outcome variable, three-year share price following initial issuance. The one-day return following 
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a SPAC merger announcement is reflective of investors’ perception of an acquisition’s value. 
Jenkinson and Sousa (2011) determined that this return serves as a signal for the post-merger 
performance of SPAC common shares, and investors who went against the market signal lost 
around 39% of their investments within six months and 79% of their investment after one year. 
Furthermore, the price of a warrant is tied to the performance of its underlying asset, common 
stock. When the price of common stock trades closer to the warrant’s exercise price, the warrant 
is more likely to be exercised and will be subsequently valued at a higher premium. This leads 
me to expect that the warrant price’s initial appreciation will reflect investor enthusiasm about 
the SPAC and indicate long-term positive yields.   
5. Data  
My data sample is composed of SPACs that made acquisitions between 2016 and 2018. 
By focusing on this recent three-year period, the analysis within this paper reflects the notable 
structural changes regarding shareholder approval and revised compensation structure that 
existing literature has yet to capture following the financial crisis. For this reason, my data 
sample is more similar to the SPACs observed in the current market, and my results will be more 
comparable than research conducted on SPACs over a decade ago.  
The data is cross-sectional and measures variables related to a SPAC and its acquired 
firm during single events throughout the SPAC’s lifetime. In order to collect this data, I first 
obtained a list of SPACs that made an acquisition between 2016 and 2018. Then, I utilized the 
Compustat – Capital IQ database to source the share prices of SPACs, acquired firms, and the 
NASDAQ index composite at varying points in time. This share price data was imperative to 
calculate returns of interest: three-year return, one-day return post-merger announcement, and 
one-year return post-merger. In addition, I gathered the IPO details, gross proceeds at offering 
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and months allowed to complete an acquisition, from S-1 and 8-K filings within the SEC 
EDGAR database. After completing this process, I created my data sample of 38 SPAC 
acquisitions; select acquisitions that occurred between 2016 and 2018 were excluded from the 
sample due to missing information in the Compustat – Capital IQ Database.  
 
Note: Table 1 summarizes the mean, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum values of the variables included 
in the OLS regression model. Each variable has 35 observations; 3 deals of the total sample were excluded due to 
missing warrant prices. Data was hand-collected from the Compustat – Capital IQ Database and the SEC EDGAR 
Database. 
 
Note: Figure 2 displays the distribution of three-year SPAC share prices over 6 pricing bins. Data was hand-
collected from the Compustat – Capital IQ Database. 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Share Price 3 Years Post-IPO $6.72 $5.45 $0.00 $29.66
Gross Proceeds at Offering $264.61 $214.21 $40.00 $1,035.00
Months Allowed to Complete Acquisition 22.18 3.38 12.00 24.00
Unit/Offer Price 1.00 0.01 0.96 1.05
Initial Warrant Price $0.48 $0.42 $0.09 $1.75
One-Day Return Post-Announcement 0.63% 3.45% -17.00% 7.00%
One-Year Return Post-Merger -24.59% 42.16% -97.00% 59.00%
Binary Variable: Target Acquired in 2016 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00
Binary Variable: Target Acquired in 2017 0.34 0.48 0.00 1.00
Binary Variable: Target Acquired in 2018 0.45 0.50 0.00 1.00


























Figure 2: Three-Year SPAC Share Price Distribution
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Table 1 displays the summary statistics of variables included in the OLS regression 
model. The data sample is weighted as follows: 21% 2016 acquisitions, 34% 2017 acquisitions, 
and 45% 2018 acquisitions. Given the growth of the U.S. SPAC market, it is reasonable that 
more recent years have a higher weighting in the sample. In contrast, the three-year share price 
variable led to unexpecting findings. The average share price three years after initial issuance is 
$6.72, a considerably lower value than the average initial closing price of $9.90. Investors put 
capital into SPACs in the hopes of generating a positive return overtime; however, as 
demonstrated by Figure 2, only 8 of the 38 SPACs in the sample closed above $9.90 in three 
years. This alarming distribution calls for further investigation of the viability of SPACs as long-
term investments.  
It is imperative to note that a sample size of 38 observations limits the precision of 
estimates within this paper. SPACs are an increasingly utilized tool to go public, and at the time 
of observation, there simply were a limited quantity to observe. However, the number of SPAC 
IPOs rose dramatically in 2019 and 2020. To put this into context, 248 SPACs went public in 
2020 whereas only 13 SPACs went public in 2016 (SPACInsider, 2021). Therefore, as the recent 
SPACs begin to acquire target firms, there will be a substantially larger number of acquisitions to 
be observed in future research.  
6. Empirical Framework 
Recall that financial theory suggests investors require an equity risk premium on assets 
with increased risk. Thus, when considering the research question, I hypothesize that the returns 
on SPAC common equity will be significantly greater than the returns on the NASDAQ index 
composite. To address this, my approach is to conduct a two-sample t-test assuming unequal 
variances for each of the three years as well as the total data sample. While this method 
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determines if SPACs outperform the market, I am also interested in understanding indicators of 
value-generating behavior for SPACs. Therefore, my second approach is to conduct an OLS 
regression model. Given that there are no aspects of randomization within my data sample, the 
analysis in this paper is purely descriptive, not inferential. Associations can be distinguished, but 
a causal relationship cannot be concluded.  
6.1  Two-Sample T-test Assuming Unequal Variances  
Within the two-sample t-test, I hypothesized that there is a mean difference of 0 between 
the three-year return of SPAC common equities and the return on the NASDAQ in equivalent 
holding periods. Given that the NASDAQ is a diversified index composite, its returns are 
inherently less variable than individual SPAC common equities, so it is important to assume 
unequal variances. The resulting one-tail t-stat value will determine the direction and 











6.2   Ordinary Least Squares Regression Model 
My OLS regression model will be run in STATA and determine independent variables 
related to the outcome variable, common stock share price three years after the SPAC’s initial 
issuance. These variables include gross proceeds at offering, months allowed to complete an 
acquisition, first-day closing unit price to offer price ratio, initial warrant price, the one-day 
return on common stock following a merger announcement, and the one-year return on common 
stock following the close of the merger. In addition, I included binary variables to indicate the 




control for unobservable and observable factors that are changing each year. Specifically, I am 
interested in controlling for the market sentiment surrounding SPACs as these financial vehicles 
gained momentum year-over-year during this period.  
𝑦# = 	𝛼 +	𝛽$𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠	𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑠# +	𝛽%𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑠	𝑡𝑜	𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑒	𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛#
+ 𝛽&𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑡	𝑡𝑜	𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟	𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒# +	𝛽'𝑊𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡	𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒#
+	𝛽(𝑂𝑛𝑒	𝐷𝑎𝑦	𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛	𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡	𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡#
+	𝛽)𝑂𝑛𝑒	𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟	𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛	𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡	𝑀𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟# +	𝛽*2017# +	𝛽+2018# +	𝜀# 
where	𝑦# 	represents	Share	Price	Three	Years	After	the	SPAC	IPO 
This regression model is similar to the regression ran in Boyer and Baigent (2008)’s 
paper. In their model, they studied the relationship between the first-day closing price of SPAC 
common stock and eight independent variables: gross proceeds at offering, current trust per 
share, offer price, warrant, unit to offer price ratio, unit price first-day return, time allowed to 
find acquisition target, and time allowed to complete acquisition. Although, our models are 
similar in the fact that they both evaluate the association of structural characteristics and the 
pricing of related assets to a SPAC share price, the motivations vary. Rather than looking at 
short-term pricing, my model studies the long-term performance of SPACs and determines how 
significant events, such as announcing a merger and completing a merger, are correlated to share 
price. In addition, as the SPAC market continually matures, the structure of SPACs evolves and 
not all variables within Boyer and Baignet (2008)’s original regression model remain relevant. 
For example, when the researchers studied SPACs from 2003 to 2006, unit offer prices varied 
based on the SPAC. However, a decade later, each SPAC prices units at $10, eliminating the 
need for the unit price variable (Dimitrova, 2017).  
When interpreting the results of this model, my analysis will first identify variables of 
significance and then interpret the sign of their coefficient to determine the direction of its 
(2) 
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relationship to share price. The associations noted from the results of this model will educate 
investors on the behavior of SPACs in public equity markets and highlight indications of value-
generating behavior. By understanding these significant associations, institutional traders and 
retail traders can make more informed investment decisions.  
7. Results 
In this section, I first present the results of the two-sample t-test assuming unequal 
variances in Table 2. To answer the research question, I compare the total sample t-stat to the 
appropriate critical value and determine how the returns on SPACs compare to the NASDAQ in 
an equivalent holding period. Next, I quantify the relationship between three-year SPAC share 
price and eight independent variables by estimating the specified OLS regression model. Then, I 
discuss variables of significance, presented in Table 3, and evaluate the soundness of these 
estimations in comparison to existing literature.   
 
Note: Table 2 summarizes the average, variance, median, minimum, and maximum values by year for the three-year 
returns on SPAC common stock and the NASDAQ index composite in equivalent holding periods. Tstats assume 
unequal variances and are included to distinguish the relationship between the returns of these two assets. Share 
price data was hand-collected from the Compustat – Capital IQ Database. *p<0.10,   **p<0.05,   ***p<0.001 
The resulting t-stat for the total data sample is 9.534, a value much greater than the 
corresponding one-tail critical value of 2.418. Therefore, I conclude that the three-year returns on 
the NASDAQ index composite are statistically greater than the returns of SPAC common 
SPACs NASDAQ SPACs NASDAQ SPACs NASDAQ SPACs NASDAQ
Average -11.38% 47.16% -12.53% 50.18% -57.94% 54.55% -32.60% 51.50%
Variance 0.110 0.005 0.492 0.010 0.104 0.028 0.279 0.017
Median -3.81% 46.34% -28.61% 50.35% -61.65% 52.72% -43.09% 50.07%
Max 28.26% 61.52% 182.48% 66.68% 3.50% 80.70% 182.48% 80.70%












equities at the 1% level. Within the conceptual model section of this paper, I outlined the 
differing risk profiles between these two assets. I assumed SPACs are intrinsically riskier and 
that investors in this asset class require a higher equity risk premium. This led me to hypothesize 
SPACs would yield a superior three-year return. However, the results of this t-test clearly 
indicate that SPACs do not outperform the market. While the maximum three-year return on 
SPACs was a lucrative 182.48%, the returns were highly variable, and the average SPAC 
returned -32.60%. In contrast, the buy-and-hold strategy on the NASDAQ proved to be very 
effective as the returns were far more consistent and averaged 51.50%.  
 
Note: Table 3 displays the output of the OLS regression. This output describes the relationship between the outcome 
variable, common stock share price three years after the SPAC’s initial issuance, and eight independent variables. 3 
deals of the total sample are excluded due to missing warrant prices. Data was hand-collected from the Compustat – 
Capital IQ Database and the SEC EDGAR Database. Standard Errors are in parentheses.  
*p<0.10,   **p<0.05,   ***p<0.001 
Furthermore, the OLS regression model found four variables of significance: initial 
warrant price, one-day return post-merger announcement, one-year return post-merger, and the 
2017 binary variable. The model estimates 𝛽', the coefficient on initial warrant price, to be 4.069 
and statistically significant from 0 at the 10% level. The value of this coefficient suggests that, 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error T-Stat P-Value 
Initial Warrant Price 4.069 (2.014) 2.02 0.054*
One-Day Return Post-Announcement 39.390 (15.392) 2.56 0.017**
One-Year Return Post-Merger 7.364 (1.443) 5.10 0.000***
Gross Proceeds at Offering -0.007 (0.004) -1.58 0.126
Months to Complete Acquisition 0.168 (0.192) 0.88 0.388
Unit/Offer Price 43.869 (47.569) 0.92 0.365
Binary Variable: Target Acquired in 2017 3.124 (1.452) 2.15 0.041**
Binary Variable: Target Acquired in 2018 -1.581 (1.531) -1.03 0.311




Adjusted R-Squared = 0.7119
 Table 3:                                                     SPAC Regression Analysis 
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on average, a $1 increase in the first-day closing warrant price will generate $4.07 in value for 
the common stock share price three years after initial issuance. This estimation is sound given 
that warrants represent the right to purchase a share of common stock at a specific exercise price 
within a certain window of time. As a stock trades closer to the exercise price, the warrant is 
more likely to be exercised and will be subsequently valued at a higher premium. Thus, this 
positive relationship suggests first-day appreciation signals positive long-term gains in common 
shares.  
In addition, the coefficient on the one-day return following a merger announcement 
variable supports the previous work of Jenkinson and Sousa (2011).  𝛽( is estimated to be 39.390 
and statistically significant from 0 at the 5% level. This is interpreted as, on average, a one 
percentage point increase in the one-day return following a merger announcement generates 
$0.39 in value for the common stock share price three years after initial issuance. According to 
the study from Jenkinson and Sousa (2011), investors who went against the market signal lost 
around 39% of their investments within six months, rising to losses of over 79% after one year. 
Thus, investors should only invest in SPACs when the market reacts positively following a 
merger announcement.  
Moreover, the three-year share price is significantly correlated with one-year post-merger 
performance. The model estimates the coefficient on the one-year return post-merger variable, 
𝛽), to be 7.354 and statistically significant from 0 at the 1% level. The estimation indicates that, 
on average, a one percentage point increase in the one-year return following merger completion 
will generate $0.07 in value for the common stock share price three years after initial issuance. 
While this is a reasonable relationship considering SPACs, this does not appear to be consistent 
with the post-merger performance of an acquiror with operational assets. Agrawal et. al (1992) 
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studied the post-merger performance of acquiring firms that made acquisitions between 1955 to 
1987. With a data sample of 765 mergers, the authors measured the cumulative abnormal 
average return (CAAR), adjusting for firm size and beta risk, over a 60-month period following 
the close of the merger. The authors concluded that the merger did not have a significant 
relationship with the acquiror’s performance in the first year following the merger; however, 
they noted shareholders lost an average of 10.26% in wealth over the first five-year period 
following the merger.  
Lastly, the model estimated the coefficient on the 2017 SPAC acquisitions binary 
variable, 𝛽*, to be 3.124 and statistically significant from 0 at the 5% level. In turn, this asserts 
that acquisitions made in 2017 are statistically different from the base case: acquisitions made in 
2016. It is possible that acquisitions in 2017 faced more favorable economic conditions or 
heightened market sentiment, leading to increased value in future share price.  
8. Discussion 
The analysis in this paper concludes that SPACs do not outperform the market and on 
average generate a negative return over a three-year period. However, the record-breaking 
amount of gross proceeds raised by SPACs over the past five years clearly demonstrate that 
capital is flooding into these investments. This begs the question: why do individuals invest in 
SPACs in public equity markets? Although my research suggests that the NASDAQ index 
composite generates superior profits with a buy-and-hold strategy, investors can create a position 
on SPACs through alternative investment strategies: exchange traded funds (ETFs) and warrants.  
A SPAC-focused ETF is an ideal tool that allows an investor to benefit from 
diversification and gain tactical exposure to this unique, rising class of assets. As outlined in the 
results section, it is difficult to identify a single winning SPAC; however, a SPAC-focused ETF 
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identifies a basket of SPACs to invest in and allocates each SPAC a specific weight in the fund. 
In turn, this structure profits from the select SPACs with growing positions and limits exposure 
to volatility that is common early on in a SPAC’s lifetime. The first SPAC-focused ETF, SPAK, 
debuted on the New York Stock Exchange on October 1, 2020. Since this launch, a variety of 
SPAC-focused ETFs arose, including SPCX and SPXZ (Murphy, 2021). It is important to note 
that each ETF differs in the selection of SPACs, weighting allocation, and management strategy. 
Therefore, an investor should consider these various factors to select an ETF aligned with one’s 
distinctive risk-tolerance and investment goals.  
Furthermore, SPAC warrants consistently outperform the return on common stock 
following the close of a SPAC merger. Gahng et al. (2021) evaluated a buy-and-hold strategy on 
SPAC warrants and common stock by measuring the return on each asset over one-year and 
three-year holding periods. This approach assumes an investor purchased the warrant or common 
stock on the listing-switch date, effectively examining post-merger performance. With a data 
sample including 105 business combinations between January 2010 to September 2020, the 
researchers concluded the one-year and three-year returns on warrants to be 44.3% and 52.8% 
respectively. In contrast, the one-year and three-year returns on common stock were -16.9% and 
-20.9% respectively. The data depicts the gap in returns between common stock and warrants to 
be widening overtime. Although the inherent riskiness of warrants merits greater returns, it is not 
clear as to why warrants prove to be a substantially more profitable investment under the buy-
and-hold strategy. Gahng et al. (2021) point to the market undervaluing warrants during the 
merger as a possible reason.  
Despite the advantages of these two alternative positions in SPACs, some investors will 
still continue to gamble on investments in individual SPAC common shares. I recommend that 
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these investors consider the previously discussed indicators of value-generating behavior, initial 
warrant price, one-day return post-merger announcement and one-year return post-merger, 
within their investment strategy. If these variables underperform, it signals potential losses in the 
long-term share price of the asset. In addition, each of these three variables occur during 
different phases in a SPAC’s lifecycle, providing an investor with multiple checkpoints to re-
evaluate their position.  
9. Conclusion 
This paper examined the long-term performance of SPAC common equity in order to 
contribute an updated analysis on SPAC behavior and inform investor decision-making. In the 
two-sample t-test assuming unequal variances, I concluded that the three-year return on the 
NASDAQ index composite is statistically greater than the return of SPAC common equities in an 
equivalent holding period. Thus, SPAC common equities do not outperform the market. 
Furthermore, I estimated the relationship between the three-year SPAC share price and eight 
independent variables in an OLS regression model. The results of this model found four 
variables of significance: initial warrant price, one-day return post-merger announcement, one-
year return post-merger, and the 2017 binary variable. Although the lack of randomization in my 
data sample limits the ability to determine causal effects, the significant positive associations of 
these four variables distinguish indicators of future value-generating behavior.  
Even with these indicators, the inconsistent nature of SPACs proves selecting a single 
winning SPAC to be difficult. Therefore, I suggested two alternative positions an investor can 
take to gain exposure to SPACs. With an ETF investment, an investor profits from select SPACs 
with growing positions and limits one’s exposure to volatility that is common early on in a 
SPAC’s lifetime (Murphy, 2021). However, for investors who still aim to invest in a single 
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company, one should consider an investment in warrants. Warrants require a minimal upfront 
capital investment, and they have outperformed SPAC common equity with a long-term buy-
and-hold strategy post-merger (Gahng et al., 2021).  
Looking forward, it is imperative that additional research is conducted to evaluate SPACs 
as alternative investments. The data sample within this paper, studying SPAC acquisitions 
between 2016 and 2018, consisted of 38 observations. However, SPAC IPOs increased 
dramatically in 2019 and 2020. For example, in 2016, only 13 SPACs went public, but in 2020, 
248 SPACs went public. Thus, future research lends itself the opportunity to study a substantially 
larger sample of SPAC acquisitions, leading to the increased precision of estimates. In addition, 
Murray (2017) asserts that regulators have allowed the market to try new designs to reinforce a 
management team’s position while protecting investors. This occurred during the financial crisis 
when two significant adaptations in SPAC structure arose from a shift in investors’ preferences 
towards safer investments. With the recent explosive growth of the U.S. SPAC market, it is 
probable that the structure of these investments will continue to evolve and become increasingly 
efficient in years to come. Therefore, until the market stabilizes, literature in this field will 
continue to suffer from limitations associated with market infancy.  
Beyond the continued study of SPAC financial performance, I recommend that the post-
merger performance of SPACs and of traditional mergers be further examined. Recall that 
Agrawal et. al (1992) found that a merger did not have a significant relationship with the 
acquiror’s performance in the first year following the merger. In comparison, the OLS regression 
model within this paper estimated that the one-year post-merger performance of a SPAC’s target 
has a significant positive association with its three-year share price. It is unclear as to why the 
short-term price impact of a merger is significant to SPACs and not traditional mergers. 
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However, this relationship is important to understand for companies who are considering growth 
strategies through an IPO, SPAC, or strategic acquirer. If further studies continue to find that 
SPAC mergers face significant short-term price impacts and traditional mergers do not, these 
findings may deter select companies from pursuing SPACs and lead them to seek alternative 
growth opportunities.  
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